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ASRS Purposes
? Identify deficiencies and discrepancies in 
the National Airspace System 
• Objective: Improve the current aviation system
? Provide data for planning and improvements 
to the future National Airspace System 
• Objective: Enhance the basis for human factors 
research & recommendations for future aviation 
procedures, operations, facilities, and equipment 
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FAA and NASA Partnership
? MOA signed by Administrators for FAA 
and NASA
. . . To provide information to the FAA 
and the aviation community to assist 
them in reaching the goal of 
identifying and eliminating unsafe 
conditions to prevent accidents.
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System-Wide Event Occurrences
? ASRS is complementary to other systems of reporting 
and focuses on precursors to the most severe events
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Dispatch Reporting to ASRS
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ASRS Alert Message Priorities
ASRS has no direct authority to directly correct safety issues.
It acts through and with the cooperation of others.
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? HDN VOR DME-B Approach
? Dash 8-400 Performance Data Availability
? Company Fuel Policies Affecting Flight Safety
? SJU Runway 26 Displacement
? SMF Transponder "Dead Zone" on Taxiway A10
? PDC Anomaly for SLC WEVIC One RNAV SID
Dispatch Related Alerts
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? SJU Runway 26 Displacement
• ASRS received a call from the San Juan Airport Office, 
stating “…they have taken care of the confusion 
regarding the NOTAM for Runway 8. The 10,000 foot 
runway has been reduced by 220 feet, leaving 9,780 
feet of useable runway. The 220 feet is the new 
displaced threshold. They also relocated the Runway 8 
ILS. It was indicated that all these changes have been 
covered by a new NOTAM. We were also informed that 
the Runway 26 VASI is OTS UFN.”
? SMF Transponder "Dead Zone" on Taxiway A10
• ASRS received a call from the SMF Airport Operations Officer 
stating “…a NOTAM was issued to address this issue.”
Dispatch Related Alerts – Responses
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System Driven Workarounds
? Software Issues
• Weather Decoding
• Uncommanded Restarts
• Frozen Workstations
• Missing Information
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Software Workarounds
? Air carrier Dispatcher laments the dispatch planning 
software that his company has begun using and 
believes that it is creating extra work.
“[Our new dispatching software] continues to give bad 
information. It must be programmed to recognize a 
single runway. When that runway is currently closed it 
assumes the airport is closed and recommends an 
alternate. A flight can NOT be dispatched to a closed 
airport. Adding an alternate doesn’t matter. It’s 
recommending illegal advice.”
(ACN 1077764 Excerpt) 
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? A Dispatcher described a software issue that allows 
the FMC to download a different route other than 
planned and filed.  Crews manually change the route 
when the error is caught.  
“…Gho t restricted areas on our oftware…I noticed on of my 
[transcon] flights had an odd routing. I fixed it, built my own route 
and moved on. Next flight I attempted to use the wind route hook
up. The plan did a strange zig-zag. I had [The Chief Dispatcher] 
look into this. There were ACTIVE restricted areas on my desk. 
Put in by other dispatchers currently working the floor…yet not 
visible on the map. Later I went back to the flight to add an 
alternate. [The software] re-optimized my old route and put the 
flight back on the zig-zag. I did not catch this. I should not have 
to. The Captain called, irrate.” (ACN 1084077 Excerpt) 
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Software Workarounds
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System Driven Workarounds
? Same Flight Numbers
• Multiple airborne aircraft with same flight 
numbers
• Uncoordinated modifications of flight numbers
– Adding same suffix
• Lack of safeguards
– Having to remember altered flight numbers before 
release
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? Dispatcher reported both he and a next sector 
Dispatcher both added the same suffix to same flight 
number aircrafts.
“… radio number was required to be dded to my LAX-ZZZ 
flight to avoid a conflict with the late arriving inbound fli t of 
the same number. I complied with this by adding a suffix [X] 
to the call sign...what I was not aware of was that my 
counterpart on the sector next to me had also added the 
same radio number suffix [X] to his flight with the same flight 
number. I was not advised in any messaging alert that this 
radio number was already in use…we ended up having two 
flights with the same radio number active at the same time 
on LAX ATC frequencies….” (ACN 1084047 Excerpt)
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Same Flight Number Workarounds
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? Dispatcher reported a Operational Control Center 
computer failure. After the system returned to normal 
they found two aircraft with the same flight number 
taxiing at a Midwest airport.
“The Operational Control Center had a total computer failure. 
After the systems were back up w  found out that ther  were 
two flights on the ground at [the same airport], at the same 
time with the same flight number. One was taxiing in, and the 
flight number under my control was taxiing out. We did not 
receive a warning about the flight number conflict.” (ACN 
922401 Excerpt)
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Same Flight Number Workarounds
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System Driven Workarounds
? Alternate Routing Issues
• Recommending routes into weather
• Multiple redundant messages
– Distracting
– Increased workload
– Increased stress level
• No alternate scenario recommendations
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? Dispatcher expressed concern with their dispatch 
analytical system alternate route recommendations.
“System is advising the Dispatcher to violate FAR 121.619. 
Because of Dispatcher interaction, ZZZ2 was added as 
alternate for ZZZ1 thus ignoring the automated message 
advising to violate FAR 121.619. …program does not 
understand what is required to determine alternate 
weather minimums per FAR 121.619. …Eliminate [this 
program] until this product can provide a useful purpose to 
the Dispatcher, otherwise it will continue to mass produce 
unnecessary messages that will be ignored since it is 
advising inaccurate and false direction for the Dispatcher 
to implement…” (ACN 1083639 Excerpt)
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Alternate Routing Workarounds
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? A Dispatcher for a major air carrier addressed his 
concern that excessive workloads and fatigue 
contributed to errors he made in providing a takeoff 
alternate for on of the flights for which he shared 
responsibility.
“The pilot of one of my flights requested a takeoff clearance via
ACARS. I was pressed by other simultaneous tasks and 
executed a rapid scan of possible alternates. I found [an airport] 
that lo ked to me as one of the best and I amended the r lease 
via ACARS... After the flight took off and I completed all the 
other pressing tasks I reviewed the weather…and realized that 
[the alternate] did not have legal alternate minimums…. The 
major threat element I can identify for this incident was the 
extremely high workload…. It is extremely difficult and 
challenging to maintain situational awareness when you have 
10 or more flights en route, more flights on the ground facing 
long ground delays, adverse weather that is constantly 
changing, and on top of that you need to plan, re-plan and 
amend flights…” (ACN 998849 Excerpt)
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Alternate Routing Workarounds
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Summary of System Driven Workarounds
? Excessive workload and fatigue effects situational 
awareness and responsibilities
? Lack of procedures for handling multiple flights 
with same flight number create opportunity for 
confusion 
? Understaffing potentially causes FAR compliance 
challenges in planning and briefings 
? Multiple carriers are experiencing issues with 
software changes, implementation and 
modifications
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